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I. RelIc of feudalIsm
As the Magna Carta, England’s Great Charter of Liber-
ties,1 marks its eighth centennial, it is appropriate to ask 
what’s in it. The answer, it turns out, lives up to the legend. 
What’s in the Magna Carta is the beginning of modern le-
gal thought.
The Great Charter set the expectations that for 800 years 
have shaped the development of the law in England, America, 
and around the globe. Like a blazing light piercing medieval 
darkness, the Magna Carta illuminated the importance of legal 
principles, fair procedures, proportional punishment, official 
accountability, and respect for human dignity. It was unlike 
any legal document that had ever come before.
A. Rooted in War
The terms of the Magna Carta were negotiated on the 
battle front during a cessation in an English civil war be-
tween King John and rebellious barons. The document 
was not intended to articulate enlightened standards for 
far-flung places or future ages, but it ended up doing so by 
focusing on the issues of the day. Those problems includ-
ed crushing taxation; excessive fines; the freedom of the 
Church; the rights of widows, children, 
and heirs; the operation of the courts; the 
duties of guardians; the rise of French im-
migrants within the English bureaucracy; 
and the return of hostages. 
B. Understandable and Still Important
The more than five dozen clauses in the 
Magna Carta follow no discernible plan of 
organization. Many of the provisions are 
concerned with “feudal incidents”—the 
incidental rights of lords arising from feu-
dalism’s hierarchical organization of status relationships. 
However, if one can get past the jumbled arrangement of the 
material and the unfamiliar terminology, many of the provi-
sions can easily be understood. 
More surprising is the fact that the Magna Carta’s text 
reflects many concerns that are still central today. Consider-
ing that eight centuries have passed, and that there are pro-
found differences between the feudal age and the digital age, 
these commonalities are remarkable. They suggest that the 
ancient Magna Carta and modern jurisprudence were “cut 
from the same cloth.”
C. The Many Magna Cartas
There were actually many Magna Cartas. The initial ver-
sion was sealed by King John (reigned 1199–1216) on a small 
sheet of parchment dated June 15, 1215.
However, the 1215 Charter was never implemented and soon 
became a dead letter. Within three months, King John repudiated 
the charter. It was also nullified by Innocent III, an able pope, on 
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the ground that it had been extracted by coercion. Thus, the English 
civil war soon resumed. Fortunately, roughly a year later, John died 
of dysentery on October 19, 1216, leaving his nine-year-old son, 
Henry III, to succeed him. That royal transition changed the course 
of history for it gave the Magna Carta a second chance. 
For political purposes, the Magna Carta of 1215 was resurrect-
ed and reissued in a revised form by the new King’s advisers. They 
retained enough of the 1215 charter to appeal to the barons and 
the masses, but not so much as to seriously hamper the new King.
The original sixty-three clauses of the 1215 charter dwin-
dled to forty in the 1216 Magna Carta. All this was done with 
lightning speed.
The 1216 charter was just the beginning. All told, Henry III 
(reigned 1216-72) and his successor, Edward I (reigned 1272-
1307), reissued the Magna Carta at least six times. All of these 
versions differed substantially from the 1215 version. Thus, de-
pending on which Magna Carta is at issue, the relevant date 
may be 1215, 1216, 1217, 1225, 1265, 1297, or 1300. Like a comet 
that appeared by popular demand, the Magna Carta continu-
ally re-crossed the dark sky of the thirteenth century.
Until the 18th century, “the 1215 and 1225 charters were 
hopelessly confused.”2 The 1225 Magna Carta is the one that 
was eventually set out in the place of greatest honour at the be-
ginning of England’s first roll of statutes in 1297. However, the 
1215 Magna Carta is undoubtedly the most famous. That first 
edition is the one that arose from the dramatic confrontations 
between King John and the barons that have since been depicted 
in countless works of art.
In none of the editions of the Magna Carta were the sub-
stantive clauses numbered. However, historians inserted numer-
als into translations for purposes of reference. The numbers and 
quotations in this article refer to the sixty-three clauses in the 1215 
Magna Carta as translated on the website of the British Library.
II. decIsIons Based on
laws and evIdence
The most famous provision is Clause 39 which declares, in 
language still sparkling with gem-like quality, an unquestionable 
commitment to legal principles. Clause 39 states: “No free man 
shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or posses-
sions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any 
other way, nor will we proceed with force against him, or send 
others to do so, except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by 
the law of the land.” This product of the medieval world seems 
entirely modern and enlightened.
A. Due Process
Clause 39 arose directly out of King John’s abuses. “In some 
cases, John proceeded . . . by force of arms against recalcitrants 
as though assured of their guilt, without waiting for legal pro-
cedure.”3 In other cases, he attacked his enemies by subjecting 
them to a “travesty of judicial process.”4 In some cases, John’s 
“political and personal enemies were exiled, or deprived of 
their estates, by the judgment of a tribunal composed [not of 
equals but] entirely of Crown nominees.”5 Driven by the King’s 
avarice, the administration of justice was frequently just ma-
chinery for enriching the royal treasury. 
Clause 39’s essential point was clear. John was no longer 
to take the law into his own hands. Clause 39 has been cred-
ited as the first embodiment of the “English idea of due pro-
cess” and its American progeny.6
B. Trial by Jury
The idea of trial by jury is inextricably linked to the Magna 
Carta. Thus, when American judges cite the Magna Carta in 
explaining to citizens called for jury duty the importance of 
their role, it is with this connection in mind.
Clause 39’s reference to judgment by one’s equals or peers 
is “what we might think of today as the right to trial by jury.”7 
However, “[w]hether or not the Magna Carta’s reference to a 
judgment by one’s peers was a reference to a ‘jury’ . . . [is] a 
fact that historians now dispute.”8 As Oxford professor Arthur 
L. Goodhart explained, “The word ‘judgment’ here refers to 
the preliminary decision concerning the procedure to be ad-
opted at trial, and not a final judgment to be reached in accord 
with that procedure. . . . [T]he first decision was that of the 
jury of peers while the final decision was reached by methods 
that seem strange to us. . . . [T]he jury of peers . . . determined 
whether the party should be put to his proof in one of the es-
tablished ways: ordeal by hot iron or by water, compurgation, 
wager of law, trial by battle, or production of charter.”9 
Adherents of this view argue that trial by jury developed 
only after trial by ordeal gradually fell out of fashion follow-
ing the Roman Catholic Church’s Fourth Lateran Council. 
That conclave, held in Rome in 1215, forbade the clergy from 
taking part in judicial ordeals. Regardless of which view is cor-
rect, it is certain that Clause 39 contributed to establishing the 
principle of trial by jury based on relevant evidence. 
Interestingly, the Magna Carta contains a second, longer, 
less well-known provision that deals with a type of jury which 
had a role to play in resolving certain controversies between 
King John of England and King Alexander of Scotland. Clause 
59 stated: “With regard to the return of the sisters and hos-
tages of Alexander. . . , his liberties and his rights, . . . [t]his 
matter shall be resolved by the judgment of his equals in our 
court.” Clause 59 clearly implied that the “equals” would 
render a final judgment.
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 C. Evidentiary Support
Clause 38 of the 1215 Magna Carta stated: “In [the] future 
no official shall place a man on trial upon his own unsup-
ported statement, without producing credible witnesses to the 
truth of it.” To modern eyes, this provision seems unsurpris-
ing. However, it may have been revolutionary. The provision 
offered “real protection to the common man” against abuses 
by arrogant manorial officials.10
III. eThIcs In GoveRnmenT
The 1215 Magna Carta contains a trove of anti-corruption 
provisions. Though framed in terms addressing the realities 
of thirteenth-century life, those provisions were driven by the 
same concerns that inspire modern efforts to fight corruption.
A. Justice Is Not for Sale
Clause 40 is the shortest and most elegant provision in the Mag-
na Carta. In language that still glows with ethical clarity, it provides: 
“To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.”
Bribery of the king and his judges, and delays in rendering 
judgment, had been serious problems in the decades leading 
up to the barons’ rebellion. Clause 40 “has been interpreted as 
a universal guarantee of impartial justice to high and low.”11 
Today, the principle that justice is not for sale is a cornerstone 
of the American principles of judicial ethics which broadly 
prohibit judges from receiving gifts or other things of value 
from persons whose cases may come before them.
B. Improper Economic Benefit Is Prohibited
Three additional clauses in the 1215 Charter were intended, in 
part, to address other corrupt practices. Clause 28 provided: “No 
constable or other royal official shall take corn or other movable 
goods from any man without immediate payment, unless the sell-
er voluntarily offers postponement of this.” Clause 30 stated: “No 
sheriff, royal official, or other person shall take horses or carts for 
transport from any free man, without his consent.” And Clause 31 
said: “Neither we nor any royal official will take wood for our cas-
tle, or for any other purpose, without the consent of the owner.”
These provisions were intended to address abuses related 
to the royal right of purveyance, the prerogative of the king to 
requisition supplies from the citizenry as the royal court trav-
elled about England, but with an obligation to pay. The problem 
was that the persons from whom supplies were requisitioned 
were often not paid, or were paid too little, or were paid too 
late. Some were compensated in exchequer tallies, a hated form 
of currency which could be used only to pay taxes.
The abuses related to the right of purveyance included not 
only takings to provide for the king’s household, but requisi-
tioning by officials for their own personal benefit. Clauses 28, 
30, and 31 were intended to address that kind of abuse, too. In 
doing so, these clauses presaged the development of a broader, 
fundamental principle of modern government ethics jurispru-
dence. That principle holds that a government official or em-
ployee may not use official power for personal economic benefit.
C. Officials Must Be Accountable
Under anti-corruption principles, public officials and em-
ployees must be accountable for corrupt practices. In modern 
societies, the procedures often involve criminal indictment or 
impeachment. The Great Charter sought to achieve the same 
goal by extracting from King John a promise in Clause 55 that 
a committee of twenty-five barons could hold him accountable, 
by majority vote, for failure to return all fines unjustly exacted. 
Another provision, Clause 12, greatly limited the king’s power to 
impose unconsented taxation. That provision, which was perma-
nently dropped in 1216, foreshadowed the struggle between the 
Crown and its American colonies more than five centuries later.
Iv. InsTITuTIonal RespecTaBIlITy
A just legal system operates in a manner that merits the 
respect and confidence of the citizenry. The Magna Carta con-
tained several clauses that contributed to this goal.
A. Professional Qualifications and Temperament
It is often taken for granted that judges will be learned in the 
law. However, even today, this is not always the case. Because 
judicial qualifications were also problems in medieval England, 
the barons forced King John to promise in Clause 45: “We will ap-
point as justices, constables, sheriffs, or other officials, only men 
that know the law of the realm and are minded to keep it well.”
B. Judicial Jurisdiction
A corollary principle is the idea that judicial tasks should 
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A panel from the bronze doors of the U.S. Supreme Court shows 
King John attaching his seal to the Magna Carta.  
—Courtesy of the U.S. Supreme Court
be performed only by judges. Otherwise, litigants could be 
harmed by the actions of unqualified judicial interlopers. The 
barons included as Clause 24 this language: “No sheriff, con-
stable, coroners, or other royal officials are to hold lawsuits 
that should be held by the royal justices.”
From a modern perspective, it would be easy to applaud 
this provision as advancing separation of powers and judi-
cial independence, and avoiding the conflicts of interest that 
would arise if a sheriff responsible for an arrest was tasked 
with deciding the guilt of the accused. However, those con-
cepts were not well developed in thirteenth-century England. 
The most that can be said is that Clause 24 was a useful step 
toward clarifying judicial jurisdiction.
Clause 34 stated: “The writ called precipe shall not in [the] fu-
ture be issued to anyone in respect of any holding of land, if a free 
man could thereby be deprived of the right of trial in his own lord’s 
court.” This provision was drafted against the background of the 
ongoing struggle that reflected the expanding jurisdiction of the 
royal courts and the diminishing power of the local feudal courts. 
Unlike the writ of right, which allowed the royal courts to interfere 
with the operation of feudal courts only in cases where they had 
failed to do justice, the writ precipe did not require an “allegation of 
failure of justice but simply ignored the lord’s jurisdiction”12 by or-
dering the sheriff to command the tenant to deliver disputed land to 
another or to appear in the royal court to explain his disobedience.
Jurisdictional disputes between courts are inevitable, but they 
must be sorted out based on principle. In a world where kings and 
judges were often bribed, a procedure like the writ precipe, by which 
a “feudal lord was . . . robbed by the King of his jurisdiction,”13 in-
vited abuse, and it was important that such a risk be curbed. 
C. Accessibility and Transparency
Several provisions in the Magna Carta sought to 
advance the goals of judicial accessibility and transpar-
ency. Until the late twelfth century, it was the custom 
of the royal courts to travel with the king from place 
to place as he handled the realm’s business. This often 
forced litigants and observers to traverse great distanc-
es and incur substantial expenses in order to participate 
in court proceedings. To address these issues, Clause 
17 provided: “Ordinary lawsuits shall not follow the 
royal court around, but shall be held in a fixed place.” 
Though no particular place was named, Westminster 
was probably intended. However, royal pleas, in which 
the Crown had a special interest, were treated differ-
ently, and continued to travel with the king.
1. Popular Petty Assizes
 Henry II, John’s father, had been a legal innovator. 
Among his reforms were the three petty assizes (trial 
sessions). These efficient dispute resolution mechanisms 
proved popular. They quickly resolved questions about 
who was entitled to possession of real property. 
The grievance of the barons was that the petty assizes were too 
infrequent and inconvenient. To remedy these deficiencies, Clause 
18 stated: “Inquests of novel disseisin, mort d’ancestor, and dar-
rein presentment shall be taken only in their proper county court. 
We . . . will send two justices to each county four times a year . . . .”
Clause 19 further mandated that: “If any assizes cannot be tak-
en on the day of the county court, as many knights and freeholders 
shall afterwards remain behind . . . as will suffice for the administra-
tion of justice, having regard to the volume of business to be done.”
2. Undermining Trial by Combat
Clause 36 provided: “In [the] future nothing shall be paid or ac-
cepted for the issue of a writ of inquisition of life or limbs. It shall be 
given gratis, and not refused.” This reform was important because 
it undermined the system of trial by combat—which sometimes 
amounted to nothing more than “legalized private revenge.”14
The writ of inquisition allowed certain criminal defen-
dants to avoid, or at least delay, trial by combat while a di-
versionary procedure played out. If the accused’s neighbors 
decided that he was innocent, trial by combat was avoided.
The problem during King John’s reign is that the writ of in-
quisition was used not to save the innocent from the capricious 
process of trial by combat, but as an important source of rev-
enue. Thus, the writ was sold only to those with deep purses.
Clause 38, which made the writ freely available, moved the 
legal system toward processes under which decisions would be 
based on relevant evidence rather than physical might. It also 
limited the corrupt practices of selling justice only to the wealthy.
D. Prompt Remedies
Six provisions in the Magna Carta demonstrated concern 
with the timeliness of remedies. The most surprising of these 
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provisions, Clause 48, imposed tight deadlines for the inves-
tigation and abolition of certain “evil” customary practices 
relating to forests, warrens, and riverbanks. Clause 32 stated: 
“We will not keep the lands of people convicted of felony in 
our hand for longer than a year and a day, after which they 
shall be returned to the lords of the ‘fees’ concerned.” Clause 
52 established a general principle requiring remedies for vio-
lations of rights, but with a significant exception that was ap-
plicable if King John was on a Crusade. Clause 53 applied the 
“Crusade exception” to the resolution of legal disputes involv-
ing forests and certain other matters. There were many such 
controversies because English kings had appropriated forests 
for their exclusive use as sources of wealth and recreation, 
which interfered with the ability of commoners to forage for 
food and fuel. Finally, Clauses 56 and 57 specifically guaran-
teed that Welshmen were entitled to prompt remedies.
v. RespecT foR human dIGnITy
The 1215 Magna Carta demonstrated respect for human 
dignity by addressing proportionality of punishment and the 
needs of some of the most vulnerable persons.
A. Proportionality
Clause 20 eloquently stated: “For a trivial offence, a free man 
shall be fined only in proportion to the degree of his offence, and 
for a serious offence correspondingly, but not so heavily as to 
deprive him of his livelihood. In the same way, a merchant shall 
be spared his merchandise, and a villein [a feudal tenant] the 
implements of his husbandry, if they fall upon the mercy of a 
royal court . . . .” This provision reflected a “humane desire not 
to reduce a poor wretch to absolute beggary.”15 The same propor-
tionality principle was echoed in Clauses 21 and 23, which dealt 
specifically with earls, barons, and the ordained religious. 
B. Legal Protection of the Vulnerable
In the feudal world, “much of the sovereign’s revenue 
came from feudal incidents resulting from the king’s control 
of persons under disabilities. 
1. Widows and Surviving Children
A widow “could be married at the wish of her feudal over-
lord to any man willing to pay the going rate.”16 However, in 
rare cases a widow was sufficiently wealthy to be able to outbid 
suitors and buy a charter from her lord guaranteeing that she 
would not be forced to remarry. “John did a lively business in 
payments for the widow’s privilege of remaining single, of re-
marrying whom she wished, or of keeping control of the lives 
and fortunes of her minor children.”17 The payments, which 
sometimes included chattels (e.g., hunting animals) as well as 
money, testified “eloquently to the greed of the King, the anxi-
ety of the victims, and the extortionate nature of the system.”18
The charter addressed these deeply resented practices in 
language so strong that it is something of a landmark in the 
recognition of women’s rights. Clause 8 states with certainty: 
“No widow shall be compelled to marry, so long as she wishes 
to remain without a husband. But she must give security that 
she will not marry without royal consent, if she holds her lands 
of the Crown, or without the consent of whatever other lord she 
may hold them of.” This victory for women was qualified. This 
was only a prohibition against a forced second or later marriage, 
and a woman could not choose to remarry without her lord’s 
consent. Moreover, most widows had no option other than to 
remarry because there were few career opportunities. The al-
ternatives were to face financial destitution or enter a nunnery.
Clause 8 may have been rooted more in concerns about 
the reputation and status of noble families, than in solicitude 
for widows. Such familial concerns are reflected in Clause 6 
which provides: “Heirs may be given in marriage, but not to 
someone of lower social standing. Before a marriage takes 
place, it shall be made known to the heir’s next-of-kin.”
At the time of the Magna Carta, “[i]t was customary for a land-
owner to bestow marriage portions [of his land] on his daughters.”19 
In addition, it was usual for a new husband to establish a dowry 
Magna Carta 800th Anniversary 1215-2015
San Antonio Lawyer  10  March-April 2015
15 Id. at 292.
16 See geoffrey Hindley, tHe Magna Carta: tHe story of tHe origins of liberty 167 (2008).
17 franCes gies & JosepH gies, WoMen in tHe Middle ages 28 (1978).
18 Id.
19 MCKeCHnie, supra note 3, at 216. 
Library of Congress display of the 1215 Magna Carta 
(photo courtesy of Vincent Johnson)
for his wife as they were leaving the altar. If the husband failed to 
do so, the law stepped in and fixed the dower at one-third of all 
his lands. The problem for a widow was that “she could only enter 
into possession [of the land] by permission of the King, who had 
prior claims and could seize everything.”20 To address this problem, 
Clause 7 provided: “At her husband’s death, a widow may have her 
marriage portion and inheritance at once and without trouble. She 
shall pay nothing for her dower, marriage portion, or any inheri-
tance that she and her husband held jointly on the day of his death. 
She may remain in her husband’s house for forty days after his 
death, and within this period her dower shall be assigned to her.”
Issues remained relating to personal property, including 
food and other necessities. Those matters were addressed in 
Clause 26, which provided limited protection to widows and 
surviving minor children by making clear that their reasonable 
shares of a deceased man’s estate would not be treated as assets 
of the estate, except in cases of an unpaid debt to the Crown.
2. Heirs
Clauses 2 and 3 of the 1215 Magna Carta limited the inher-
itance taxes that could be charged to the male heir of an earl, 
baron, or other person holding lands directly of the Crown in 
exchange for military service. Clause 2 capped the amount that 
would be charged to an heir who had reached majority. Clause 
3 then exempted minor male heirs from any such obligation.
3. Duties of Guardians
Guardians of the property of minors “had always strong in-
ducements to exhaust the soil, stock, and timber, uprooting and 
cutting down whatever would fetch a price, and replacing noth-
ing.”21 To protect minor heirs from these abuses, Clause 4 stated: 
“The guardian of the land of an heir who is under age shall take 
from it only reasonable revenues, customary dues, and feudal 
services. He shall do this without destruction or damage to men 
or property . . . [and is] answerable to us . . . .”
Clause 5 of the 1215 Magna Carta further specified that a 
guardian “shall maintain the houses, parks, fish preserves, 
ponds, mills, and everything else pertaining to it, from the rev-
enues of the land itself . . . [and when] the heir comes of age, he 
shall restore the whole land to him, stocked 
with plough teams and such implements of 
husbandry as the season demands and the 
revenues from the land can reasonably bear.”
4. Debtors
Clause 9 addressed the treatment of 
debtors. It provided in part: “Neither we 
nor our officials will seize any land or rent 
in payment of a debt, so long as the debtor 
has movable goods sufficient to discharge 
the debt.” In an agrarian society, this 
helped to prevent a creditor from taking 
away a debtor’s livelihood.
vI. equal TReaTmenT
The subject on which the Magna Carta is most at odds with 
modern sensibilities is the issue of equal rights. 
A. Free Men
Clause 1 clearly signalled that the Magna Carta was a 
charter of liberties only for free men. It provided: “TO ALL 
FREE MEN OF OUR KINGDOM we have . . . granted . . . all 
the liberties written out below . . . .” 
In addition, the most important provision in the Magna Car-
ta—Clause 39, which guaranteed legal protection from criminal 
sanctions—expressly limited its protection to “free men.” 
However, there was at least a hope that non-free men might 
receive similar treatment. Clause 60 stated: “All these customs 
and liberties that we have granted . . . . Let all men of our kingdom 
. . . observe them similarly in their relations with their own men.”
More importantly, Clause 40, the elegant provision on access 
to justice, did not purport to exclude anyone. It said simply: “To 
no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or justice.”
B. Jews in England
Jews in England lent money at high rates. However, they 
did business only at the mercy of the king, who raked off much 
of the profits in the form of arbitrary taxes.
The barons, many of whom were debtors, discovered 
a way to strike at both the money-lenders and at John. That 
cause was the plight of heirs whose fortunes were likely to 
be depleted by the high interest rates on loans that had been 
made to the deceased. Clause 10 provided in part: “If anyone 
who has borrowed a sum of money from Jews dies before the 
debt has been repaid, his heir shall pay no interest on the debt 
for so long as he remains under age . . . .”
A second clause—framed in terms of the interests of widows 
and surviving children—struck at the assets often used as secu-
rity for loans. Clause 11 provided: “If a man dies owing money to 
Jews, his wife may have her dower and pay nothing towards the 
debt from it. If he leaves children that are under age, their needs 
may also be provided for on a scale appropriate to the size of his 
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holding of lands. The debt is to be paid out of the residue . . . .” 
Thus, under Clause 11, a widow’s dower lands were be-
yond the reach of her deceased husband’s creditors. In many 
cases, the effect of this provision was to reduce the security 
for a loan by one-third. What remained was further reduced 
by amounts needed to provide necessities for minor children. 
Historian Paul Johnson says the “Magna Carta undermined 
the economic basis of English medieval Jewry.”22
C. Testimony by Women 
The Magna Carta confirmed the existing rule, which held 
that the testimony of women was in many instances legally 
insignificant. Clause 54 stated: “No one shall be arrested or 
imprisoned on the appeal of a woman for the death of any 
person except her husband.”
This clause, which dealt only with cases involving murder, 
meant that no woman could sue for harm caused by the death 
of her father, son, or friend, but only the death of her husband. 
The charter recognized no similar disability in the case of men.
D. Earls and Barons
Earls and barons were extensively insulated from criminal 
liability by Clause 21, which effectively created a class priv-
ilege for the aristocracy. Clause 21 states: “Earls and barons 
shall be fined only by their equals, and in proportion to the 
gravity of their offence.” The number of earls and barons was 
small, so it is easy to envision how this provision was condu-
cive to a “conspiracy of silence.”
E. Immigrants
One concern of the English barons was the fact that French 
supporters of King John during his military quests in France 
had returned with him to England and were promoted to posi-
tions of power and authority. To remedy this, King John was 
forced to promise that they would be dismissed. Thus, Clause 
50 launched an ad hominem attack against immigrants whose 
names are now oddly memorialized in the Great Charter, whom 
the king promised to “remove completely from their offices.”
F. On Balance
The 1215 Magna Carta was in no sense a model of equal 
treatment under law. However, it is important to remember 
that the Magna Carta did in fact protect a much wider array 
of persons and entities than just free men and aristocrats. It 
recognized the freedom of the church; the rights of “all mer-
chants” and “any man” to travel; the liberties, customs, and 
obligations of cities and similar entities; and the interests and 
needs of hostages and mercenaries (in addition to the interests 
of widows, surviving children, heirs, wards, and persons ac-
cused of crime). Though it did not provide for full equality, the 
Magna Carta moved legal institutions across the globe closer 
to the ideal of equal justice under law.
vII. oTheR pRovIsIons
Not every provision in the Magna Carta addressed issues 
of lasting importance. Many clauses dealt with temporary is-
sues such as feudal obligations and taxes, intestate distribu-
tion, forests and rivers, standardized units of measure, found-
ers of abbeys, and pardons.
vIII. conclusIon
Today, authors are quick to point out that only four of the 
original sixty-three provisions in the 1215 Magna Carta are 
still good law in the United Kingdom. Two of those provi-
sions guarantee the freedom of the English Church and the 
rights of the City of London. The other two provisions deal 
with the administration of justice, guaranteeing that justice 
will not be sold or denied, and that persons will be punished 
only in accordance with the lawful judgment of their equals 
or the law of the land. 
It is not surprising that the other fifty-nine clauses have 
been repealed. They dealt in specific terms with the problems 
of a different age. No one would have expected them to last 
800 years. The important thing is that the Magna Carta set high 
expectations for the development of Anglo-American law that 
continue to inspire the reform and administration of justice.
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